EU’s Chat Control Proposal Could End Encryption

You should know about chat control, the political discussions, and the implications it would have on society.

On June 20, 2024, the EU Council was going to discuss arguably the most controversial EU law draft of all time, the so-called “chat control” proposal.  

This post is not intended as a legal analysis of the proposal but rather a high-level explanation of what chat control is and the heavy implications it would have if adopted (which it hopefully won't be). Effectively, chat control would break end-to-end encryption (E2EE) and make private messaging a relic of the past in Europe. 

In this week's post, we will take an extended look at the political process that led to the proposal's making and finally highlight the important implications that would follow if the proposal became law.  

Chat Control  

Originally proposed by the EU Commission in May 2022, chat control aims to combat the spread of online "child sexual abuse material" (CSAM) and "sexual solicitation of children" (grooming), essentially by obligating providers of messaging apps to monitor people's private conversations. If a user refuses to consent to the envisaged monitoring, they'll be unable to share photos, videos, links, or attachments via the messaging apps. 

Specifically, all communication sent through messaging apps such as Messenger, WhatsApp, Signal, and Telegram would be scanned by an AI system. Anything that seems suspicious by resembling CSAM or grooming would automatically be forwarded to a dedicated EU Centre with expertise in preventing and countering child sexual abuse, and hereafter to Europol and national law enforcement.  

The proposal emphasizes that the “detection technology” shall be unable “to extract any other information from the relevant communications than the information strictly necessary” to detect CSAM and grooming (Article 10 (3) (b)), be “the least intrusive in terms of the impact on the users’ rights to private and family life” (Article 10 (3) (c)), and be “sufficiently reliable” (Article 10 (3) (d)). It’s very doubtful if any of these intentions can be fulfilled.